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Applying the Parratt/Hudson Doctrine:
Defining the Scope of the Logan
Established State Procedure
Exception and Determining the
Adequacy of State Postdeprivation
Remedies
By KAREN M. BLUM*
Introduction: The Basic Tenets of Section 1983 Litigation
Regardless of one's point of view, the recent "trend to repeal section
19831 by court decree" 2 cannot be ignored or dismissed. The new com-
position of the United States Supreme Court suggests the likelihood of an
even more rigorous campaign to substantially limit the circumstances
under which the federal remedy provided for under section 1983 will be
available. The Court's primary concern is that the statute not become a
"font of tort law."3 The potential for overloading the section 1983 recep-
tacle derives from the Court's own interpretation of the statute in the
watershed case of Monroe v. Pape.4
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.A., Wells College, 1968; J.D.,
Suffolk University Law School, 1974; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1976. The author would
like to thank David Friedman for his assistance in the research and preparation of this Article.
1. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2. Haag v. Cuyahoga County, 619 F. Supp. 262, 272 (N.D. Ohio 1985). See generally
Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain
Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1985); see also Zagrans, "Under Color of" What
Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. RFv. 499, 504-25 (1985)
(noting various "limiting doctrines" with which the Court has attempted to restrict the tide of
litigation under section 1983); Nahmod, Due Process, State Remedies, and Section 1983, 34 U.
KAN. L. REV. 217, 217-18 (1985) (noting recent concerns with "federalism, overdeterrence,
overburdened courts, and trivialization of the Constitution").
3. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
4. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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In Monroe, thirteen Chicago police officers conducted a search and
made an arrest under circumstances which clearly violated both state
tort law and federal constitutional law.5 The Supreme Court had to de-
termine two issues: (1) whether the police officers' conduct was "under
color of state law;" and (2) if it was, whether it could be remedied under
section 1983. In upholding the availability of the federal remedy, the
Court established three basic tenets to govern section 1983 litigation in
future cases. First, conduct unauthorized by state law would still satisfy
the "under color of state law" requirement of section 1983 when such
conduct stemmed from power "possessed by virtue of state law."6 Sec-
ond, the availability of the federal remedy is in no way dependent upon
the lack of an adequate remedy under state law.7 Thus, Monroe estab-
lished a doctrine of "no-exhaustion" for section 1983 claimants, a doc-
trine reaffirmed in Patsy v. Board of Regents.8 Finally, section 1983 per se
imposes no state-of-mind requirement as a condition for liability.9
Twenty-five years after Monroe, the basic tenets of the section 1983
remedy established by that decision have withstood a wide range of as-
saults. In recent years,' however, the Court has been developing what
Professor Nahmod has called a "'new' due process methodology"10
which has caused speculation as to whether the seeds have been planted
for Monroe's destruction."1 The two key cases giving birth to this new
methodology are Parratt v. Taylor12 and Hudson v. Palmer13 A third
case, Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 4 must also be viewed as an essen-
tial component of the analytical scheme, for it is in Logan that the
Supreme Court establishes an important limitation on the new
methodology.
5. Id. at 172.
6. Id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941)).
7. Id. at 183 ("It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give
relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first
sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.").
8. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
9. 365 U.S. at 187.
10. Nahmod, supra note 2, at 219.
11. See, e.g., Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor: Opening and Closing the Door on Section 1983,
9 HASTINGS CONT. L.Q. 545, 546 (1982) ("If the Parratt decision is followed to its logical
extreme, it would undermine the basis for most section 1983 cases now brought in federal
court."); see generally Note, Unauthorized Conduct of State Officials Under the Fourteenth
Amendment: Hudson v. Palmer and the Resurrection of Dead Doctrines, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
837 (1985) (discussing possibility that Parratt and Hudson may represent a repudiation of core
principles established in Monroe).
12. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). Parratt was overruled in nonrelevant parts in Daniels v. Wil-
liams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
13. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
14. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
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This Article inquires into the scope and meaning of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Parratt, Hudson, and Logan, and, more particularly,
focuses on recent developments and problems in the application of the
Parratt/Hudson doctrine.15 In addressing "all the hard questions"16 left
open by the Court in Parratt, Hudson, and Logan, this Article takes the
position that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine should apply to nonproperty
deprivations, but must be confined to the procedural due process context.
Furthermore, the doctrine should be limited in its application by an in-
terpretation of the Logan "established state procedure" exception which
is consistent with the concept of official policy developed by the Court in
the section 1983 municipal liability cases.17 Finally, the postdeprivation
remedy analysis dictated by the doctrine should be concerned primarily
with systemic fairness as opposed to adequacy in fact. Given these guide-
lines, the new due process methodology can be an effective and legitimate
tool for avoiding the "font," without destroying the basic tenets of the
section 1983 remedy as established in Monroe. This Article concludes by
summarizing, from the perspective of both plaintiffs and defendants, the
status of the law regarding the application of the Parratt/Hudson doc-
trine and what arguments must be made to either avoid or procure a
dimissal on Parratt/Hudson grounds.
I. The Parratt/Hudson Doctrine
A. Parratt v. Taylor
In Parratt, an inmate sought redress under section 1983 for the neg-
ligent loss of hobby materials valued at $23.50. Taylor asserted that
through their negligence, the warden and hobby manager of the prison
deprived him of his property without due process of law. i" The United
States District Court for the District of Nebraska agreed with Taylor and
granted summary judgment in his favor.19 The Eighth Circuit affirmed
the judgment.20
15. The Parratt/Hudson doctrine embodies principles gathered from the holdings of both
cases, applied to determine whether a plaintiff has a procedural due process claim which can be
remedied under § 1983. The Parratt/Hudson doctrine is the equivalent of Professor Nahmod's
"new" due process methodology. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
16. Wells & Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA.
L. REV. 201, 257 (1984).
17. See, eg., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986); City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
18. 451 U.S. at 530.
19. Id. at 529.
20. Parratt v. Taylor, 620 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
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Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality of the Supreme Court,
noted the four elements necessary to maintain a fourteenth amendment
procedural due process claim: (1) the defendants must have acted under
color of state law; (2) the affected interest of the plaintiff must be one
recognized and protected by the Constitution; (3) the alleged loss or im-
pact on the affected interest must amount to a constitutional deprivation;
and (4) the deprivation must be accomplished without due process of
law.21
The Court quickly concluded that the first three elements of the due
process claim had been satisfied. Relying on Monroe, the Court first reaf-
firmed the basic proposition that one who acts pursuant to authority pos-
sessed by virtue of state law, is acting under color of state law, even when
the challenged conduct violates or is unauthorized by state law.22 Sec-
ond, the inmate's hobby materials clearly constituted a property interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.23 Finally, the Court con-
cluded that, although the loss had been effected through simple negli-
gence, the loss still amounted to a deprivation within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24
In concluding that negligence could trigger a constitutional depriva-
tion, the Court reaffirmed the Monroe proposition that section 1983 im-
poses no particular state-of-mind requirement.25 In his concurrence,
Justice Powell criticized the plurality's recognition of constitutional dep-
rivations premised upon the negligent acts of state officials. 26 He would
limit due process claims to those alleging deliberate or intentional acts by
someone acting under color of state law. 27 The Court has recently
adopted Justice Powell's position, overruling Parratt to the extent that it
recognized mere negligence as sufficient to cause a deprivation under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.28
Despite this limited overruling of Parratt, an important aspect of
Parratt remains untouched: the Court's limitation on the fourth element
of a due process claim. This element requires that for a deprivation of
property to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
21. 451 U.S. at 536-37.
22. Id. at 535.
23. Id. at 537.
24. Id. at 536-37.
25. Id. at 535.
26. Id. at 546 (Powell, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 548-49.
28. See Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 665 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct.
668, 671 (1986); see also Williams v. City of Boston, 784 F.2d 430. 434 (lst Cir. 1986)
("[A]llegations of common law negligence, without more, do not state a claim for deprivation
of liberty without due process of law.").
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ment, it must occur without the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.29 Parratt holds that when a depriva-
tion of property results from the random and unauthorized conduct of a
state employee and predeprivation process would have been impractica-
ble, if not impossible, due process is not violated so long as the state
provides some meaningful postdeprivation opportunity to redress the
lOSS. 30
B. Hudson v. Palmer
In Hudson, the Court extended the rationale of Parratt to a claim
involving an intentional taking of property by a prison guard. Palmer
claimed that during the course of a "shakedown" search of his cell for
contraband, Hudson, a prison employee, intentionally destroyed certain
of his noncontraband personal property. Palmer alleged that this de-
struction constituted a deprivation of his property without due process of
law.31 In affirming the Fourth Circuit's application of Parratt to deny
section 1983 relief, the Supreme Court held:
[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state
employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural require-
ments of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if
a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available. For
intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by state em-
ployees, the State's action is not complete until and unless it pro-
vides or refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy....
The controlling inquiry is solely whether the State is in a position
to provide for predeprivation process.32
Hudson answered affirmatively the question of whether Parratt ap-
plies to intentional, as well as negligent, deprivations of property. The
Court's extension of Parratt to intentional deprivations of property was
foreshadowed in Parratt by its discussion of Ingraham v. Wright.33 In
Ingraham, the Court held that when (1) predeprivation process would be
impracticable, and (2) the state had in place adequate postdeprivation
remedies to provide redress for any erroneous deprivations, then subject-
ing students to corporal punishment without providing them with a
predeprivation hearing did not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 4
29. 451 U.S. at 540.
30. Id. at 543.
31. 468 U.S. at 520.
32. Id. at 533-34.
33. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
34. Id. at 683.
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Although it is now settled that Parratt applies to both negligent and
intentional deprivations of property, conflict remains among the lower
federal courts as to whether the Parratt/Hudson doctrine will extend to
procedural due process claims involving unauthorized deprivations of life
or liberty interests.35 Such an extension has only been hinted at by the
Supreme Court. In Temple v. Marlborough Division of the District Court
Department,36 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted the
division among the lower federal courts on Parratt's application to non-
property interests. Adopting the view that Parratt applies to claims in-
volving deprivations of liberty interests, the court observed that "[t]he
controlling inquiry ... is not the nature of the interest, but whether the
state was in a position to provide predeprivation process and whether it
supplies adequate postdeprivation process."' 37 This author takes the posi-
tion that the nature of the interest is relevant to, but not independently
determinative in, ascertaining what process is due under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, the nature of the interest may indirectly affect the
application of the Parratt/Hudson doctrine.38
35. Compare those cases indicating that Parratt should not be extended beyond depriva-
tions of property, Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 826 (1st Cir. 1985) (Bownes, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 879 (1986); Conway v. Village of Mount Kisco, 758 F.2d 46, 48
(2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Cerbone v. Conway, 106 S. Ct. 878 (1986); Martin v.
Afflerbach, 623 F. Supp. 565, 568 (D. Me. 1985); Thompson v. City of Portland, 612 F. Supp.
390, 392 (D. Me. 1985); with Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1984)
(no reason to distinguish between liberty and property interests) and King v. Pace, 575 F.
Supp. 1385, 1388 n.1 (D. Mass. 1983) (Parratt applies to deprivations of life and liberty). Com-
mentators are likewise in disagreement. Compare Note, Defining the Parameters of Section
1983: Parratt v. Taylor, 23 B.C.L. REv. 1218 (1982) (Parratt should not apply to nonproperty
deprivations) with Note, Due Process Application of the Parratt Doctrine to Random and Unau-
thorized Deprivations of Life and Liberty, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 887 (1984) (Parratt should
apply to nonproperty deprivations); see also Zagrans, supra note 57, at 521-22 (suggesting
Ingraham may have represented an extension of the Parratt/Hudson doctrine to a deprivation
of liberty).
The Supreme Court may soon resolve the conflict surrounding Parratt's application to
nonproperty interests. In Conway, 758 F.2d at 48, the Second Circuit refused to apply the
Parratt/Hudson doctrine to dismiss a claim of malicious prosecution, concluding that such a
claim implicated a deprivation of liberty actionable under section 1983, and that the existence
of parallel state tort remedies was irrelevant. The Court need not reach the merits of the
Parratt/Hudson question on appeal, however, if it concludes that allegations of malicious pros-
ecution do not rise to the level of a consitutional tort.
36. 395 Mass. 117, 479 N.E.2d 137 (1985).
37. Id. at 124-25, 479 N.E.2d at 143. Accord Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 584 (6th Cir.
1985) (en banc).
38. See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
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II. Claims to which the Parratt/Hudson Doctrine does Not
Apply
It is helpful to sort out the claims to which the Parratt/Hudson doc-
trine does not generally apply. As Justice Stevens has noted, three kinds
of rights are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.39 First, are rights secured by the Bill of Rights and made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause.' Second, is the right to be protected from arbitrary or irrational
government conduct: a right to substantive due process.4 Third, is the
right to fair procedure, or procedural due process.42
A. Claims Based on Violations of Rights Protected By The Bill of
Rights
If a plaintiff asserts that a right guaranteed by the Bill of Rights has
been violated, the Parratt/Hudson doctrine will not apply and the ade-
quacy of the state remedy is irrelevant.43 Justice Rehnquist distinguished
the Bill of Rights claims in cases like Monroe v. Pape' and Estelle v.
Gamble,45 from the type of claim asserted in Parratt.46 Monroe involved
a fourth amendment violation, while Estelle involved an eighth amend-
ment violation. Virtually all the lower federal courts agree that the Par-
ratt/Hudson doctrine is not implicated when a plaintiff alleges that
constitutional rights protected by provisions independent of the Four-
teenth Amendment have been violated.47
39. Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 677 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 678.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. See also Akbarr-El v. Shelley, 631 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (it is
now clear that the substantive rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and made applicable to
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment remain unaffected by
the Parratt/Hudson doctrine).
44. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
45. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
46. 451 U.S. at 536.
47. See, e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1970 (1986) (the existence of state tort remedies does not preclude the
direct assertion of a fourth amendment claim in federal court); Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d
1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing a fourteenth amendment due process claim from
violation of the Fourth Amendment); Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1984) (to
apply Parratt to an alleged fourth amendment violation would be to write Monroe out of exist-
ence). But see Farrell v. Miklas, 605 F. Supp. 202, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (the Parratt/Hudson
doctrine should apply where predeprivation process is not practicable or possible and an ade-
quate postdeprivation remedy exists, regardless of whether the alleged deprivation violates a
specific provision of the Bill of Rights).
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B. Claims Alleging Violations of Substantive Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can also be
the source of a substantive due process claim.4" As Justice Blackmun
stated in Parratt, "there are certain governmental actions that, even if
undertaken with a full panoply of procedural protection, are, in and of
themselves, antithetical to fundamental notions of Due Process."'49 The
thrust of the substantive due process claim is that the challenged govern-
mental conduct is so egregious, so "inherently impermissible," that the
conduct is prohibited regardless of the procedural safeguards accompa-
nying the conduct.50
Some controversy exists regarding the degree of culpability and the
severity of harm that must be established in order to make out a prima
facie substantive due process claim. However, the general consensus
holds that if a substantive due process claim is alleged, the Par-
ratt/Hudson doctrine does not bar the availability of the section 1983
remedy: "When a state actor violates substantive rights, the constitu-
tional violation is complete at the time of the deprivation, irrespective of
the postdeprivation procedures that might be available for redressing the
wrong." 51
1. Claiming Excessive Use of Force by the Police
Claims of excessive use of force by police officers are generally
treated as claims asserting substantive due process violations. Clearly, a
complaint alleging excessive use of force by the police should not be con-
ceived "as only a right to have recourse to certain procedures before or
after the attack .... - In Johnson v. Glick,53 the Second Circuit estab-
lished the guiding standard for substantive due process claims in this
context:
48. Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. at 678 (Stevens, J., concurring).
49. 451 U.S. at 545 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
50. Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605, 614 (D. Mass. 1982).
51. Holland v. Breen, 623 F. Supp. 284, 288 (D. Mass. 1985). Accord Daniels v. Williams,
106 S. Ct. at, 678 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Mann v. City of Tucson, 782 F.2d 790, 793
(9th Cir. 1986) (Parratt not applicable to denial of substantive due process); Gilmere v. City of
Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1500 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1970 (1986);
Ramos v. Gallo, 596 F. Supp. 833, 838 (D. Mass. 1984). But see Mann v. City of Tucson, 782
F.2d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 1986) (Sneed, J., concurring) (Parratt should apply to "all unforesee-
able deprivations of life, liberty, and property as well as all unplanned violations of 'substan-
tive' due process rights"); Farrell v. Miklas, 605 F. Supp. 202, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (the
Parratt/Hudson doctrine should apply even where the alleged deprivation violates substantive
due process); see also Comment, Parratt v. Taylor: Don't Make a Federal Case Out of It, 63
B.U.L. REv. 1187, 1217-22 (1983). 1
52. Buranen v. Hanna, 623 F. Supp. 445, 449 (D. Minn. 1985).
53. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 4L4 U.S. 1033 (1973).
In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a
court must look to such factors as the need for the application of
force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force
that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm.
5 4
The standard, as formulated by the Supreme Court, is whether the chal-
lenged police conduct "shocks the conscience" of the court. 5
Since the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Tennessee v. Garner,56
plaintiffs would be well advised to characterize an excessive force claim
as a fourth amendment as well as a substantive due process claim. In
Garner, the Supreme Court held that "apprehension by the use of deadly
force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment."57 In the wake of Garner, some lower federal courts now
analyze excessive force claims arising from police-citizen encounters
under both the Fourth Amendment and substantive due process.5 8 How-
ever, some federal judges have indicated that the Fourth Amendment
might be the only source of protection when a plaintiff's claim is based on
the use of excessive force in the course of an arrest. 9
In a court which (1) applies the same standard to determine "rea-
sonableness" under the Fourth Amendment as it does to determine what
"shocks the conscience" under the substantive due process doctrine, and
(2) views the Parratt/Hudson doctrine as inapplicable to either claim, the
characterization of the claim under either the Fourth or the Fourteenth
Amendment will be insignificant as a practical matter. It is possible,
however, that courts may apply different standards for the fourth amend-
54. Id. at 1033.
55. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
56. 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985).
57. Id. at 1699.
58. See, e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1502 (1lth Cir. 1985) (en banc),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1970 (1986) (beating and shooting of the plaintiff was held actionable
under the Fourth Amendment); Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985) (exces-
sive use of force by police officer in transporting arrestee supports a fourth amendment claim);
Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1399 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1644
(1986) (recognizing propriety of fourth amendment analysis of excessive force claims); Bibbo
v. Mulhern, 621 F. Supp. 1018, 1023-24 (D. Mass. 1985) (inquiry in excessive use of force case
focuses on reasonableness of "seizure").
59. See, e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d at 1507 (Tjoflat, J., concurring and
dissenting) (the Fourth Amendment is the exclusive constitutional vehicle for analyzing
seizures involving excessive use of force); Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d at 1405 (Easterbrook,
J., concurring) (use of the Due Process Clause to achieve substantive ends has no support in
the Constitution; claimed right to be free from intentional infliction of emotional distress in the
course of arrest is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment).
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ment analysis than for the substantive due process analysis.6° Thus, the
characterization of the claim becomes crucial.
While the Supreme Court has made it clear that simple negligence
cannot give rise to a fourteenth amendment procedural or substantive
due process claim, the Court has left open the question of "whether
something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or 'gross
negligence,' is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process
Clause."61 Some lower federal courts have held that a substantive due
process claim requires an allegation of an intentional act or a "purposeful
infliction of injury."62
On the other hand, the analysis for a fourth amendment violation
calls for a balancing of the nature and extent of the intrusion on the
individual's rights against the governmental interests allegedly furthered
by the intrusion.63 In the fourth amendment context, the courts apply an
objective standard to determine whether the officer's conduct was a rea-
sonable response to particular facts: "The officer's pure heart provides
no defense if his conduct was unreasonable in light of the facts he knew
or should have known; the officer's evil design does not invalidate his acts
if the facts otherwise support his deeds."'  Thus, state of mind may be
irrelevant in the fourth amendment setting.65
Given the strong possibility that courts will require proof of intent
or malice when a claim rests on substantive due process grounds, and
that the state-of-mind inquiry will not be relevant in the fourth amend-
ment analysis, a plaintiff claiming excessive use of force in the course of
an arrest would be wise to frame the complaint in fourth amendment
terms. Yet, if there is any uncertainty as to whether excessive use of
force occurred during the course of a search or seizure, and therefore
would be subject to fourth amendment constraints, the substantive due
process claim should be included as well. In some cases, people who
have not been the subject of a search or seizure by law enforcement offi-
cials have raised excessive use of force claims on substantive due process
60. Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d at 1407 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("The most sig-
nificant difference between substantive Due Process and reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment is that one requires scrutiny of motive and the other forbids it.").
61. Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 667 n.3 (1986).
62. Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 586 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc). See also Holland v.
Breen, 623 F. Supp. 284, 288 (D. Mass. 1985) (acknowledging that most cases raising substan-
tive due process claims against police officers involve conduct that was intentional).
63. Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1699 (1985).
64. Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d at 1407 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
65. See Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668, 674 n.6 (1986) (Blackmun, J. dissenting)




grounds to avoid a Parratt/Hudson dismissal.66
2. Claiming Illegal Denial of Building Permits and Zoning Variances
Considerable authority supports treating complaints of arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal denials of building permits or zoning variances as
substantive, rather than procedural, due process claims.67 Once such
claims are characterized in terms of substantive due process, it is likely
that courts will not apply the Parratt/Hudson doctrine and the existence
and adequacy of state remedies will be irrelevant. The First Circuit
stands in the minority in this area, consistently holding that local deci-
sions involving land use planning, zoning variances, building permits, or
licenses do not implicate due process, "at least when not tainted with
fundamental procedural irregularity, racial animus, or the like. ...
Even when local officials have clearly violated state law, the First Circuit
has not found that the claim rises to the level of a substantive due process
violation. 69 Recently, after rejecting a section 1983 claim for denial of a
gravel removal permit, the First Circuit made the following observation:
While the Supreme Court has yet to provide precise analysis con-
cerning claims of this sort, we feel confident that where, as here,
the state offers a panoply of administrative and judicial remedies,
litigants may not ordinarily obtain federal court review of local
zoning and planning disputes by means of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.70
Thus, in the First Circuit, absent the operation of a constitutionally im-
permissible discriminatory factor in the decision making process, or a
constitutional deficiency in established state procedures, a plaintiff with a
dispute concerning zoning, licensing, or permit decisions will be forced to
pursue his state administrative or judicial remedies in lieu of a section
1983 claim based on a violation of substantive due process.
66. See, e.g., Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980) (corporal punishment of
student gave rise to substantive due process claim); Hall v. Ochs, 623 F. Supp. 367, 375 (D.
Mass. 1985) (recognizing substantive due process claim of daughter who was struck by an
officer while removing her father from car); Brooks v. Miller, 620 F. Supp. 957, 962 (N.D.
Miss. 1985) (substantive due process implicated when acting mayor shot plaintiff in attempt to
enforce ordinance against drinking in public places); Borek v. Town of McLeansboro, 609 F.
Supp. 807, 809 (S.D. Ill. 1985) (claim for relief was stated under substantive due process when
the town supervisor allegedly used excessive force on the plaintiff).
67. See, eg., Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 603-07 (8th Cir. 1986) (discussing
the law and opinions of other circuits and adopting the majority position that "denial of a
building permit under some circumstances may give rise to a substantive due process claim").
68. Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 989 (1982).
69. Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517, 1523 (1st Cir. 1983).
70. Raskiewicz v. Town of New Boston, 754 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir.), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct.
135 (1985). See also Cloutier v. Town of Epping, 714 F.2d 1184 (1st Cir. 1983); Chiplin Enter-
prises, Inc. v. City of Lebanon, 712 F.2d 1524 (Ist Cir. 1983).
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In Roy v. City of Augusta,71 the First Circuit recognized the limited
circumstances under which there was a possibility of a federal due pro-
cess claim as a result of a license denial. The plaintiff in Roy had been
denied a renewal of his pool hall license and had pursued his state court
remedies. He proved that city officials had flouted a ruling by the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court, thus rendering the state's process a nullity. He
further claimed that it was impossible for the state courts to correct the
harm that had occurred.72 Although the First Circuit did not specify the
nature of the due process claim a plaintiff might establish in a case like
Roy, arguably it was a procedural due process claim that could be as-
serted only after the plaintiff had established that his remedies under
state law were inadequate to correct the wrong that had resulted from
the defendants' flouting of the state's process.73 Given this interpreta-
tion, Roy remains consistent with the First Circuit cases refusing to ac-
knowledge substantive due process claims in the land use context.
C. Procedural Due Process Claims Involving Deprivations Effected by
Established State Procedure
It is important to understand that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine does
not eliminate the section 1983 remedy for procedural due process viola-
tions, but rather restricts the availability of the remedy by defining what
is a procedural due process claim and when it is "ripe" for assertion
under section 1983. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, "Parratt merely lim-
its the group of claims that allege procedural due process violations; once
a bona fide procedural due process claim is asserted, the Monroe v. Pape
rule applies."'74
71. 712 F.2d 1517 (1st Cir. 1983).
72. Id. at 1523-24. In this respect, Roy is distinguishable from Park View Sand & Gravel,
Inc. v. Town Bd. of Rochester, 625 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1985). In Park View, the defend-
ants had failed to comply with two state court judgments ordering the defendants to allow the
plaintiff to operate a gravel pit on its land. The federal court dismissed the plaintiff's section
1983 claim for damages, concluding that "there [were] adequate state procedures through
which the plaintiff [could] seek relief." Id. at 457.
73. In an analogous context, the Supreme Court has recently held that claims under the
Just Compensation Clause are not ripe for review under section 1983 until the plaintiff has
exhausted procedures made available by the state for providing compensation, and has been
denied recompense for the taking. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamil-
ton Bank of Johnson City, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3121 (1985). See also Golemis v. Kirby, 632 F.
Supp. 159, 163-64 (D.R.I. 1985) (applying Williamson).
74. Findeisen v. North E. Indep. School Dist., 749 F.2d 234, 238 n.5 (5th Cir. 1984), cert
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2657 (1985) (emphasis in original). In this respect, the Second Circuit failed
to undertake the appropriate analysis in Conway v. Village of Mount Kisco, 758 F.2d 46, 48
(2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Cerbone v. Conway, 106 S. Ct. 878 (1986), when it
concluded that an application of Parratt and Hudson, resulting in the dismissal of a section
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized the fundamental
requirement of procedural due process as an opportunity to be heard "at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."75 Once a plaintiff has
established a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest, the
question of what procedural requirements must attend that deprivation is
a matter of federal law.76
In Mathews v. Eldridge,7 the Supreme Court developed a test which
balances the governmental and private interests affected to decide
whether a hearing is required prior to a given deprivation:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of Due Process generally re-
quires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private in-
terest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute pro-
cedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, includ-
ing the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.78
In the determination of whether predeprivation process should be consti-
tutionally compelled, the nature of the interest affected by the depriva-
tion seems relevant. A court might be more inclined to find
predeprivation process required where the interest affected is life or lib-
erty rather than property. The Mathews test, which considers the private
interest affected by the challenged official conduct, supports this view.79
It is clear, however, that Supreme Court decisions applying the Ma-
thews balancing test do not turn solely on the nature of the interest in
question. In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,80 the Supreme
Court held that a public school employee was entitled to some kind of
hearing prior to the deprivation of his constitutionally protected property
interest in employment.8 1 In Ingraham v. Wright,8 2 on the other hand,
the Court concluded that due process did not require teachers to afford
1983 procedural due process claim where adequate state remedies were available to redress an
alleged deprivation of a liberty interest, would be tantamount to overruling Monroe v. Pape.
75. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
76. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980).
77. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
78. Id. at 335.
79. See id.; see also Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611 (1974) (usual rule has
been that "[w]here only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial en-
quiry is not a denial of due process.... .") (emphasis added); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578,
596 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting) (in determining what pro-
cess is due, distinctions between property and liberty become controlling).
80. 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
81. Id. at 1493.
82. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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students a hearing prior to the infliction of corporal punishment.83 The
Court reasoned that postdeprivation state tort remedies provided suffi-
cient due process even when the challenged conduct resulted in an inten-
tional deprivation of a liberty interest.84
The plaintiffs in both Loudermill and Ingraham asserted the kind of
procedural due process claims that should survive Parratt/Hudson dis-
missal and be heard as section 1983 claims. In both cases, the plaintiffs
claimed the right to be heard before the deprivation of a constitutionally
protected interest was effected through established state procedure.85
Similarly, in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,86 the state commis-
sion's failure to convene a conference on the plaintiff's claim within the
statutorily mandated time period deprived the plaintiff of his property
interest.87 In upholding the procedural due process claim, the Logan
Court distinguished Parratt:
In Parratt, the Court emphasized that it was dealing with "a tor-
tious loss of... property as a result of a random and unauthorized
act by a state employee ... not [as] a result of some established
state procedure." Here, in contrast, it is the state system itself that
destroys a complainant's property interest, by operation of law,
whenever the Commission fails to convene a timely confer-
ence.... Parratt was not designed to reach such a situation. Un-
like the complainant in Parratt, Logan is challenging not the
Commission's error, but the "established state procedure" that de-
stroys his entitlement without according him proper procedural
safeguards.
8
In Logan, the Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to
have the state commission hear the merits of his claim before the claim
was terminated.89 Otherwise, the operation and application of the state
statutory scheme deprived the plaintiff of his property without the requi-
site procedural safeguards.
In procedural due process cases like Logan, Loudermill, and Ingra-
ham, in which a plaintiff alleges that predeprivation process is possible
and constitutionally required but not provided by the established state
procedures effecting the deprivation, the courts should continue to ac-
knowledge the availability of the section 1983 remedy. Where a
83. Id. at 682.
84. Id. at 672.
85. See Nahmod, supra note 2, at 226 (noting that the corporal punishment inflicted in
Ingraham was not the result of the random and unauthorized act of an official).
86. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
87. The property interest was a cause of action under the Illinois Fair Employment Prac-
tices Act. Id. at 424.
88. Id. at 435-36 (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 434.
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pretermination hearing, mandated under Mathews,90 is not afforded to an
individual, a postdeprivation remedy will not necessarily render the dep-
rivation meaningless.91 On the merits, the courts may decide that the
state is required to provide predeprivation -process, as in Logan and
Loudermill, or that a prior hearing requirement could be too intrusive
and not proportionately beneficial, as in Ingraham. These claims, how-
ever, should not be dismissed on Parratt/Hudson grounds.
In Parratt and Hudson, the plaintiffs alleged deprivations resulting
from random, unauthorized, and unpredictable conduct of state officials.
In neither case did the plaintiff claim that he had been deprived of life,
liberty, or property by an established state procedure which denied
predeprivation process in a situation in which such process was
practicable.
The central premise of the Parratt/Hudson doctrine is that the state
cannot provide predeprivation process when state employees effect a dep-
rivation by acting contrary to established state procedures, on a random
basis and under unforeseeable circumstances. 92 When predeprivation
process cannot be provided, the sole inquiry is whether postdeprivation
remedies are adequate to redress any erroneous or wrongful substantive
deprivation that has occurred.93
A number of federal circuit courts have taken the position that when
a deprivation results from established state custom or policy, the state is
able to predict and anticipate such conduct, and therefore must provide
predeprivation process reducing the risk of an erroneous deprivation.94
90. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
91. Stana v. School Dist. of Pittsburgh, 775 F.2d 122, 129 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Nothing in
Parratt v. Taylor suggests that when a pretermination hearing is required under the Matthews
[sic] balancing, there is nevertheless no 'deprivation' in a constitutional sense as long as the
state provides some forum for post-deprivation redress.").
92. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531-33 (1984).
93. See infra notes 153-179 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Berlanti v. Bodman, 780 F.2d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 1985) (the plaintiff's debar-
ment from bidding on public contracts without prior notice and hearing was not the result of
random and unauthorized conduct when supervisory officials as a matter of custom or usage
failed to employ state administrative procedures that would have afforded predeprivation pro-
cess); Piatt v. MacDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Parratt not applied
when deprivation resulted from prison director's "routine failure" to compensate prisoners for
work done, a practice contrary to state law requirements); Hicks v. Feeney, 770 F.2d 375, 378
(3d Cir. 1985) (plaintiff's admission and confinement to state hospital was the result of estab-
lished state procedure when the state hospital followed its usual policy for court commitments,
even though this policy violated state law and the hospital's own internal regulations). Three
Supreme Court Justices have expressed views consistent with this position. See Gregory v.
Town of Pittsfield, 105 S. Ct. 1380, 1382 (1985) (O'Connor, J., joined by Brennan and Mar-
shall, J.J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari) (Parratt should not apply
when the deprivation resulted from the town's policy of not providing written notice to appli-
cants denied general assistance, even though this policy was contrary to state law).
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Thus, conduct pursuant to official state custom or policy, although a vio-
lation of formally enacted state law, will be sufficient to invoke the estab-
lished state procedure exception of Logan.95 The lower courts' logic is
sound: when the challenged conduct is contrary to formally enacted
state law but is clearly representative of official operating procedures, the
conduct, though unauthorized, is hardly random or unpredictable. 96
The state is in the position of being able to provide predeprivation pro-
cess and should not be able to avoid section 1983 liability by "the mere
promulgation of laws and regulations which, if followed, would preserve
the most fundamental of rights." ' 9 7
To invoke the established state procedure exception to the Par-
ratt/Hudson doctrine, a claim must be made that the state was able to,
but did not, provide an opportunity to be heard prior to a deprivation
that was effected through formally enacted state law or through a course
of conduct which, though unauthorized, reflected government custom or
policy.
98
III. Deprivations Unauthorized by State Law, Custom, or
Policy: Single Incident Deprivations by Policymaking
Officials
When a deprivation results from state law, custom, or policy, a
strong argument can be made that the state is in a position to provide
predeprivation process and that the constitutional violation is complete
when the deprivation has taken place without due process. The question
remains whether the state would be responsible for a lack of predepriva-
tion process when the deprivation is the result of anything short of state
law, custom, or policy. In other words, can the established state proce-
dure exception be applied when the conduct of a state official resulting in
a deprivation is unauthorized by state law and is not pursuant to a re-
peatedly followed governmental policy?
95. 455 U.S. at 435-36.
96. The reasoning of these cases is also consistent with, and analogous to, the analysis
applied in municipal liability cases under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658 (1978) (holding that a government entity may be held liable for constitutional violations
resulting from official policy or custom).
97. Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 886, 891 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 879
(1986) (emphasis in original).
98. See, e.g., McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Parratt's 'established
state procedure' exception was intended to apply only where the procedure deprives the claim-
ant of predeprivation process it would otherwise be possible to provide.").
A. Single Incident Deprivations as Random and Unauthorized Conduct
Some courts appear to be rejecting the application of the established
state procedure exception to single incident deprivations, effected by offi-
cials acting contrary to state law, regardless of the rank or responsibility
of the official involved. For example, in Yates v. Jamison,9 9 a house
owned by the plaintiffs was inspected by the Superintendent of Building
Inspection and condemned as unfit for human habitation. The city de-
stroyed the house without affording the owners notice or a predepriva-
tion hearing as required by both state and local law." The state and
local procedures required a predeprivation hearing when possible, impos-
ing on local officials a duty "to exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain
the identities and whereabouts of property owners."' 1 1 The plaintiffs al-
leged that the failure to locate them and provide them with notice and an
opportunity to be heard constituted "willful and reckless negligence" on
the part of the Superintendent. 0 2 The plaintiffs further asserted that fail-
ure to exercise the requisite diligence in searching public records repre-
sented official policy or custom of the City of Charlotte. 0 3 The Fourth
Circuit, in reversing the district court, concluded that dismissal was re-
quired on Parratt/Hudson grounds, and distinguished Logan as a case in
which the state procedure was set forth in a state statute."~ According
to the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiffs in Yates were not complaining about
established state procedure, but rather about random and unauthorized
conduct which failed to comply with established state procedure.0 5
99. 782 F.2d 1182 (4th Cir. 1986).
100. Id. at 1183.
101. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-445 (1982)).
102. Id. at 1183.
103. Id. at 1184.
104. Id. at 1184-85.
105. Id. at 1185. It is unclear from the court's opinion whether the Fourth Circuit was
rejecting the possibility of the established state procedure exception applying in cases where
official conduct violates state law, or whether the court would acknowledge the exception's
application when the evidence suggests a pattern of unauthorized conduct supporting a finding
of custom or policy. Judge Ervin, dissenting in Yates, noted that "[t]he fact that the city and
its agents may have violated state law and city regulations will not vitiate the plaintiffs' cause
of action if it was city policy or custom to do so." Id. at 1190 (Ervin, J., dissenting). In
Esquivel v. Village of McCullom Lake, 633 F. Supp. 1199 (N.D. Ill. 1986), the court criticized
Yates and refused to grant summary judgment in favor of the Village and its attorney on facts
remarkably similar to Yates. Id. at 1206-07. Although this author agrees that Yates misap-
plied Parratt and Hudson, the court in Esquivel was also somewhat confused in its application
of the doctrine. In refusing to grant summary judgment in favor of the individual defendant,
the Village attorney, the court concluded that the practicality of predeprivation process made
the Parratt/Hudson doctrine inapplicable. The question of the attorney's conduct being ran-
dom and unauthorized was discussed not in the context of whether there was any due process
violation at all, but only in the context of whether municipal liability could be demonstrated.
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In Temple v. Marlborough Division of the District Court Depart-
ment,10 6 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took a position
consistent with that of the Fourth Circuit in Yates. In Temple, the plain-
tiff was taken into custody under a state warrant of apprehension. 7 Af-
ter being interviewed by a court psychiatrist, the plaintiff was
involuntarily committed pursuant to an order of commitment signed by a
state district court judge.1°8 The plaintiff claimed he had been denied his
rights to elect voluntary commitment and to consult with counsel-
rights clearly established by state statute.10 9 The court concluded that
"[s]ince the judge and the court psychiatrist were allegedly acting in vio-
lation of an established State procedure l1o]... it would have been impos-
sible for the Commonwealth to have provided a predeprivation hearing.
In such a situation, all that Parratt requires is that the postdeprivation
remedy be adequate."'11 The Temple court never addressed the question
of whether the psychiatrist or district court judge knew or should have
known that their conduct would result in an unauthorized deprivation.
Furthermore, the court failed to discuss the relevance of the psychia-
trist's and judge's positions, as persons responsible for affording the req-
For a discussion of the relationship between the Parratt/Hudson doctrine and the cases relat-
ing to the issue of municipal liability, see infra notes 137-145 and accompanying text.
106. 395 Mass. 117, 479 N.E.2d 137 (1985).
107. Id. at 120, 479 N.E.2d at 140.
108. Id.
109. MASS GEN. LAWS. ANN ch. 123, §§ 10, 12(c) (West 1984).
110. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 123, § 10(a) (West 1986) provides:
Pursuant to departmental regulations on admission procedures, the superinten-
dent may receive and retain on a voluntary basis any person providing the person is
in need of care and treatment and providing the admitting facility is suitable for such
care and treatment. The application may be made (1) by a person who has attained
the age of sixteen, (2) by a parent or guardian of a person on behalf of a person under
the age of eighteen years, and (3) by the guardian of a person on behalf of a person
under his guardianship. Prior to accepting an application for a voluntary admission,
the superintendent shall afford the person making the application the opportunity for
consultation with an attorney, or with a person who is working under the supervision
of an attorney, concerning the legal effect of a voluntary admission. The superinten-
dent may discharge any person admitted under the provisions of this paragraph at
any time he deems such discharge in the best interest of such person, provided, how-
ever, that if a parent or guardian made the application for admission, fourteen days
notice shall be given to such parent or guardian prior to such discharge.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 123, § 12(c) (West 1986) provides:
No person shall be admitted to a facility under the provisions of this section
unless he, or his parent or legal guardian in his behalf, is given an opportunity to
apply for voluntary admission under the provisions of paragraph (a) of section ten
and unless he, or such parent or legal guardian has been informed (1) that he has a
right to such voluntary admission, and (2) that the period of hospitalization under
the provisions of this section cannot exceed ten days. At any time during such period
of hospitalization, the superintendent may discharge such person if he determines
that such person is not in need of care and treatment.
111. 395 Mass. at 127-28, 479 N.E.2d at 144.
uisite predeprivation process, to the feasibility of the Commonwealth
providing for such process.
In both Yates and Temple, the courts' conclusions suggest that a
state is never in a position to provide for predeprivation process when an
employee or official fails on a single occasion to follow state law. The
problem with this approach is that it fails to recognize that a violation of
procedural due process has occurred in situations where predeprivation
process was constitutionally mandated under federal law and required by
state law, but was simply not provided. The focus of the Yates and Tem-
ple approach is the adequacy of postdeprivation remedies in redressing
erroneous substantive deprivations, with no concern for redressing the
harm which results from the procedural deprivation.112
One federal court has expressed the possibility that a single incident
deprivation may reflect state policy. In Holloway v. Walker,11 3 the plain-
tiffs alleged that they were deprived of property through the conspirato-
rial acts of a state court judge and the opposing party in a state court
lawsuit over which the judge presided.114 In an attempt to avoid a Par-
ratt/Hudson dismissal of their procedural due process 'claim, the plain-
tiffs argued that their property was taken pursuant to established state
procedure in the form of a judicial proceeding.1 ' The Fifth Circuit, em-
ploying reasoning similar to that of the Fourth Circuit in Yates and the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Temple, determined that the
complaint did not involve any established state procedure of Texas,' 16
but instead concerned the allegedly arbitrary or corrupt conduct of an
individual judge. 117 Unlike the plaintiffs in Yates, the plaintiffs in Hollo-
way did not allege that the conduct of the state court judge amounted to
or reflected official policy in any sense. The court concluded that "[i]n
the absence of any challenge to the established judicial procedure of
Texas or allegation that Judge Walker's conspiratorial acts 'represented
112. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), the Court recognized that a denial of consti-
tutionally required predeprivation process gives rise to a claim for damages distinct from any
remedy due for an erroneous substantive deprivation. Id. at 266.
113. 784 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1986).
114. Id. at 1288.
115. Id. at 1292.
116. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1145 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 106
S. Ct. 3270 (1986), where Texaco's procedural due process claim was sustained because "the
undisputed facts indicate[d] that the automatic enforcement of the Texas lien and bond re-
quirements against Texaco's property to the extent of $12 billion lack[ed] any rational basis,
since it would destroy Texaco and render its right to appeal in Texas an exercise in futility."
Thus, where the application of established state procedure would reduce the right to appeal to
"a meaningless ritual," federal due process rights are implicated. Id. at 1154.
117. Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d at 1292-93.
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official policy,' . . . the Logan exception is inapplicable. . . .""' As a
result of Holloway, it appears that the door may be open in the Fifth
Circuit to invoke the established state procedure exception of Logan
when a defendant's conduct, though unauthorized by state law, can be
shown to reflect official policy.
B. Single Incident Deprivations as Authorized, Foreseeable Conduct
While accepting the premise that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine ap-
plies where the state cannot anticipate deprivations of constitutionally
protected interests and, thus, cannot provide predeprivation process,
some courts are confining the concept of unauthorized and random con-
duct implicit in the Parratt/Hudson rationale to the activities of nonpoli-
cymaking officials or employees. In Lavicky v. Burnett,119 the Tenth
Circuit found that particular conduct of a prosecutor, although in viola-
tion of state law, was not random and unauthorized within the meaning
of Parratt/Hudson.120 In Lavicky, an Oklahoma deputy sheriff and un-
dersheriff seized a pickup truck owned by a defendant charged with lar-
ceny. An Oklahoma statute required the prosecutor to hold the allegedly
stolen property subject to the order of a magistrate authorized to direct
its disposal. However, the prosecutor allowed a third party claiming
ownership to remove the parts of the truck. 21 Thereafter, the defendant
brought suit under section 1983 alleging that he was deprived of his
property without due process of law.1 22
Rejecting the contention that the plaintiff was restricted to state
postdeprivation remedies which would provide constitutionally adequate
procedural due process, the Tenth Circuit held that it would not have
been impractical for state officials to hold a hearing to determine the
ownership of the property before its disposition. 2 3 Moreover, the court
reasoned that the actions of the sheriffs and the prosecutor "constitute[d]
an intentional deprivation that may not be characterized as random ....
This action, planned and authorized, is not the sort of action for which
postdeprivation process will suffice." 124 Accordingly, the court ruled
that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine did not bar the defendant's section
1983 due process claim.125
118. Id. at 1292.
119. 758 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 882 (1986).
120. Id. at 473.
121. Id. at 472.
122. Id.




Relying on Lavicky, the Tenth Circuit recently held in Wolfenbarger
v. Williams '26 that deprivations resulting from the acts of police and
prosecutors gave rise to a section 1983 claim when the official acts were
initiated and controlled by the district attorney.127
The Second Circuit has adopted a position similar to, but arguably
narrower than, that of the Tenth Circuit. In Patterson v. Coughlin,1 28 an
inmate of a correctional facility was accused of being involved in an alter-
cation and was immediately placed in disciplinary confinement.1 29 The
inmate brought an action under section 1983 alleging that he was de-
prived of liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.13 Reversing the district court's dismissal of the prisoner's
complaint, the Second Circuit found that predeprivation process was
constitutionally required, and indeed was provided for by state law.13 1
The court concluded that conduct which causes a deprivation cannot be
properly viewed as random and unauthorized within the meaning of Par-
ratt, when that conduct is performed by the state official who possesses
the final authority to grant a constitutionally required hearing and has
the ability to foresee the deprivation.1 32 Because the responsible state
officials knew that the inmate was in peril of being deprived of his liberty
interest, and because no exigency requiring quick state action nor cir-
cumstance rendering a predeprivation hearing impossible or impractica-
ble existed, the court held that the prisoner was denied due process.1 33
126. 774 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1376 (1986). The Tenth Circuit
upheld the section 1983 claim of an Oklahoma pawnbroker who alleged that she was deprived
of property without due process. Police, following the directions of a district attorney, seized
property from her pawnshop and released it to a third party claiming ownership, without a
prior judicial determination of ownership as required by law. After finding that the plaintiff
possessed a constitutionally protected property interest in the stolen items sufficient to support
a due process claim under section 1983, the court held that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine could
not preclude the assertion of such claim. Id. at 362. The court reasoned that, unlike the
situations in Parratt and Hudson, the state was in a position to provide predeprivation process
and explicitly recognized this by enacting a statute which would require that process. The
court found that because the district attorney's letter reflected a "conscious decision to alter
the department-wide policy" with respect to allegedly stolen property, and because the prop-
erty was released to a third party only after direct written authorization from the assistant
district attorney, acting on the district attorney's behalf, the seizure and subsequent surrender
of the items were "planned and authorized." Id. at 365. The court concluded that "official acts
initiated and controlled by a district attorney cannot be characterized as random or unauthor-
ized." Id.
127. Id.
128. 761 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 879 (1986).
129. Id. at 888.
130. Id. at 889-90.
131. Id. at 890-91.
132. Id. at 892.
133. Id.
Summer 1986] STATE POSTDEPRIVATION REMEDIES
716 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 13:695
Thus, the Second and Tenth Circuits are in general agreement that
when a deprivation resulting from conduct contrary to state law, custom,
or policy is carried out by responsible state officials, the state must pro-
vide predeprivation process and cannot successfully assert that it was im-
practicable or impossible to do so. Arguably, there is a distinction
between the Tenth Circuit's view in Wolfenbarger, and the reasoning of
the Second Circuit in Patterson, concerning whether a state actor's con-
duct which effects a deprivation should be classified as random and unau-
thorized for purposes of deciding whether the Parratt/Hudson doctrine
applies. While Patterson could be interpreted as being limited to situa-
tions where a plaintiff is denied predeprivation process by officials en-
trusted under state law with final authority to provide a constitutionally
required or state mandated predeprivation hearing, Wolfenbarger could
be viewed as holding that a deprivation effected by any policymaking
official should never constitute random and unauthorized conduct.
There are problems with an approach that would make application
of the established state procedure exception turn solely on the status or
rank of the state official who has effected the deprivation. Unauthorized
and random conduct of upper level policymaking officials can be just as
unpredictable and unforeseeable as unauthorized and random conduct of
lower level employees. In Hudson, the Court stated: "Whether an indi-
vidual employee himself is able to foresee a deprivation is simply of no
consequence. The controlling inquiry is solely whether the state is in a
position to provide for predeprivation process." 134 Thus, for predepriva-
tion process to be feasible, the State must be in a position to foresee the
deprivation. If the policymaking official responsible for the substantive
deprivation is not the official entrusted by state law with the duty of pro-
viding for predeprivation process, then a random and unauthorized dep-
rivation effected by the policymaker is just as unpredictable as the
random and unauthorized conduct of a nonpolicymaking state employee.
In either case, it is equally impracticable for the state to provide
predeprivation process. Therefore, the Parratt/Hudson doctrine should
apply when adequate postdeprivation remedies exist to redress an errone-
ous substantive deprivation. 135
134. 468 U.S. at 534.
135. See also Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 774 F.2d 358, 366 (10th Cir. 1985) (Seth, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1376 (1986) (conduct of district attorney should not be viewed
as established state procedure nor as a statement of policy by the state itself).
C. Authorized, Foreseeable Conduct as Established State Procedure
Lavicky, Wolfenbarger, and Patterson can each be interpreted in two
different ways. One interpretation is that these decisions merely hold
that due to the policymaking authority of the state actors who effected
the deprivations, the conduct was not random or unauthorized, the dep-
rivations were foreseeable, and thus the constitutional violations became
complete when the deprivations took place without the requisite due pro-
cess of law. Consequently, the Parratt/Hudson doctrine is deemed inap-
plicable solely on the basis that the rationale underlying the doctrine
does not apply to conduct which is not random or unauthorized. Under
this view, a Parratt/Hudson dismisal would be inappropriate whenever a
policymaking official with the requisite authority effected a deprivation,
even if the conduct of the official were deemed not to reflect established
state procedure. That is, a plaintiff could make out a procedural due
process claim against the individual official even absent allegations sup-
porting governmental liability.' 36
Conversely, these cases could be interpreted as extending the estab-
lished state procedure exception of Logan to situations in which depriva-
tions are effected by decisions of policymaking officials, even when those
decisions are contrary to state law. From this perspective, the rank and
responsibilities of the state actor who effects the deprivation become im-
portant to indicate not only whether the State is in a position to foresee
the deprivation, thus precluding a Parratt/Hudson dismissal, but also
whether the conduct in question constitutes official policy, thus creating
the potential for imposing liability on the responsible government entity.
D. A Consistent Approach to Established State Procedure Under Logan
and Official Policy under Monell
In Monell v. Department of Social Services,'3 7 the Supreme Court
held that when the execution of a government's "policy or custom"
136. For example, in Whiteneck v. City of Springfield, 624 F. Supp. 372 (D. Mass. 1985),
the court assumed that a violation of the plaintiff's right to procedural due process had oc-
curred when the Police Commission, without the required hearing, revoked the plaintiff's li-
cense to deal in second-hand articles. Id. at 374. The court refused, however, to find that
revocation was made pursuant to municipal policy or custom for purposes of imposing liabil-
ity, because there was no evidence of a pattern or repeated practice of revoking licenses with-
out a hearing. Id. at 375. Although there was no discussion of the Parratt/Hudson doctrine in
Whiteneck, the result illustrates a distinction that might make sense. Denial of a required
hearing by a police commission should not be viewed as random or unauthorized conduct
calling for a Parratt/Hudson dismissal. Such conduct, however, depending upon the facts and
circumstances in the particular case, may not reflect official policy for purposes of imposing
liability on the municipality for damages.
137. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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causes a deprivation of constitutionally protected rights, the government,
as an entity, is responsible under section 1983.138 Recently, in Pembaur
v. City of Cincinnati,139 the Court considered whether a decision by mu-
nicipal policymakers on a single occasion could constitute "official mu-
nicipal policy" within the meaning of Monell.14° Pembaur involved a
forced entry and search conducted pursuant to a directive issued over the
phone by a county prosecutor, instructing deputy sheriffs "to go in and
get [the witnesses]."' 141 Writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan con-
cluded that municipal liability under section 1983 attaches when "a de-
liberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various
alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final
policy with respect to the subject matter in question."'' 42
138. Id. at 694.
139. 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986).
140. Id. at 1294. In City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985), a plurality of
the Court held that a single incident involving the use of excessive force by a local police officer
could not support an inference of a municipal policy of insufficient police training. Id. at 2436-
37. In Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1374
(1986), the Supreme Court will address the applicability of Tuttle's single incident rule to cases
of police misconduct involving more than one municipal employee and the appropriateness of
the inadequate training theory for imposing liability on municipalities under section 1983.
141. 106 S. Ct. at 1301.
142. Id. at 1300. Attaching great significance to the Sixth Circuit's determination that
under state law, both the county sheriff and the county prosecutor could establish county
policy under appropriate circumstances, a majority of the Court held that in ordering the
deputy sheriffs to enter the physician's clinic the county prosecutor "was acting as the final
decision maker for the county" and consequently the county could be held liable under section
1983. Id. at 1301.
In a concurring opinion, Justice White stated that had the controlling law placed limits on
the prosecutor's or sheriff's authority, their acts could not have been interpreted as establishing
contrary policy. Id. at 1301-02 (White, J., concurring). Thus, Justice White indicated that he
would have reached a different conclusion if, at the time of the officials' conduct, federal, state,
or municipal law proscribed such actions. Id.
In a separate concurrence, Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice White, reasoning that
because the course of conduct pursued by the county officials was "consistent with federal,
state and local law at the time the case arose, it seems fair to infer that... [the] county's policy
was no different." Id. at 1304 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, dissented, criticizing
the plurality for focusing exclusively on the status of the decision maker in determining when
policy is created. Id. at 1308 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell found that the question of
whether official policy has been formed should properly rest upon "the nature of the decision
reached or the action taken ... and the process by which the decision was reached or the
action was taken." Id. at 1308-09. According to Justice Powell, the first factor under this
inquiry "distinguishes between policies and mere ad hoc decisions" and "reflects the fact that
most policies embody a rule of general applicability," while the second factor contemplates
formal procedures which indicate that resulting decisions realistically represent official policy
within the meaning of Monell. Id. at 1309. In this context, Justice Powell had no trouble
concluding that the county prosector's "five word response to a single question over the
phone" did not amount to official policy. Id. at 1309.
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Pembaur raises the question of whether acts deemed to constitute
established state procedure for the purpose of precluding a Par-
ratt/Hudson dismissal, will be construed consistently with acts deemed
to be official policy for the purpose of imposing government liability
under Monell. If the Logan established state procedure exception is lim-
ited strictly to state procedures which have been formally implemented
or official custom or policy which has been carried out repeatedly, then
established state procedure in the Parratt/Hudson context is arguably
distinguishable from official policy within the meaning of Monell and
Pembaur.
If we accept the proposition that Justice Brennan's reasoning in
Pembaur should apply in determining what constitutes established state
procedure for Parratt/Hudson purposes, the potential distinction be-
tween the Second and Tenth Circuits' view of a state actor's policymak-
ing authority becomes important. Since the Second Circuit in Patterson
relied in part upon the fact that the prison officials possessed the final
authority under state law to grant a constitutionally compelled
predeprivation hearing when they consciously chose not to provide
predeprivation process,143 the decision can be perceived as consistent
with Pembaur. In Wolfenbarger, however, the Tenth Circuit never ex-
pressly determined whether the district attorney, whose conduct effected
the deprivation, possessed final authority with respect to the matter in
question. To the extent that Wolfenbarger stands for the proposition that
the conduct of any policymaker which effects a deprivation amounts to
established state procedure, it cannot be reconciled with Pembaur, which
held that unconstitutional conduct by a state actor possessing general
policymaking authority, without more, will not operate to impose liabil-
ity on a municipality. 1"
Even assuming the applicability of the established state procedure
exception to deprivations caused by official policy, and the consistent in-
terpretation of policymaking authority in the Parratt and Monell con-
texts, these two lines of cases are not perfectly analogous. Under Monell,
a plaintiff must establish that a state actor's admittedly unconstitutional
conduct was pursuant to official policy for the purpose of imposing liabil-
ity on the governmental entity itself. In contrast, under Parratt/Hudson,
a plaintiff basing a claim on denial of predeprivation process must estab-
lish that the deprivation was the result of official policy in order to make
143. See Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d at 892.
144. 106 S. Ct. at 1299.
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out a constitutional violation in the first instance. 145
This difference in the role of official policy, however, is not fatal to
the argument that the logic of Monell and Pembaur should be applied in
the Parratt/Hudson context. Arguably, official policy for purposes of im-
posing liability on a municipality should be interpreted much more nar-
rowly than official policy for purposes of determining whether a
constitutional deprivation even exists. Thus, in the Parratt/Hudson con-
stitutional violation context, official policy should be interpreted at least
as broadly as in the Monell/Pembaur municipal liability context.
E. Summary
In summary, cases should not be dismissed under Parratt/Hudson
whenever it is possible and practicable for the state to provide
predeprivation process. The Supreme Court stated clearly in Logan that
Parratt/Hudson is inapplicable when a deprivation of property results
from the operation of formally promulgated state law or procedure.
4 6
Lower federal courts are extending the established state procedure excep-
tion of Logan to cases in which the deprivation was effected by official
policy or custom, even if the policy or custom was unauthorized or con-
trary to state law. 47 If the key inquiry in the Parratt/Hudson analysis is
whether the deprivation was predictable, enabling the state to provide
145. Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451, 1456 n.5 (11th Cir. 1985), cerL de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 1193 (1986). The court in Esquivel v. Village of McCullom Lake, 633 F. Supp.
1199 (N.D. Ill. 1986), seems to blur this important distinction in its discussion of the
"dovetailing" of the Parratt/Hudson doctrine with the Monell/Tuttle/Pembaur line of cases.
The court states:
Parratt and Hudson point out that a governmental entity cannot violate due process
by failing to give predeprivation process when the entity could not have foreseen the
deprivation. Tuttle and Pembaur add that governmental entities act only through -
their policymaking officials and the custom and practice that those officials promote.
Under either analysis, an entity is not liable when a nonpolicymaking employee takes
a random action in contravention of the custom or policy of due process that the
entity seeks to enforce.
Id. at 1207 n.3. What the court fails to acknowledge is that under Parratt and Hudson, not
only is the governmental entity not liable in the described circumstances, but there is no consti-
tutional violation at all.
146. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1982).
147. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text; see also Zagrans, supra note 2, at 589.
Professor Zagrans suggests an interpretation of section 1983 which would make deprivations
of federal rights actionable only when the challenged conduct has been authorized by formally
promulgated state law, custom, or policy. Random, isolated incidents, unauthorized by state
law, would never suffice to invoke the established state procedure exception of Logan or to
preclude dismissal based on the rank or responsibility of the offending official. As Professor
Zagrans notes, his "reconstructed model" of section 1983 would make the Parratt/Hudson
doctrine "functionally irrelevant" to section 1983 litigation. Id. at 589.
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predeprivation process, then the extension of Logan to policy or custom
cases is justified.
The most difficult situation occurs when state law, policy, or custom
provides for predeprivation process that is constitutionally required
under federal law as well, but the official responsible for providing that
process intentionally fails to do so in effecting the substantive depriva-
tion. If the views of the Fourth Circuit in Yates148 and the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court in Temple149 were to prevail, a plaintiff
would never have a fourteenth amendment procedural due process claim
based on a denial of predeprivation process, unless the conduct causing
the substantive deprivation were authorized by formally enacted state
law or established state procedure in the narrowest sense. 150 The posi-
148. Yates v. Jamison, 782 F.2d 1182 (4th Cir. 1986). See supra notes 99-105 and accom-
panying text.
149. Temple v. Marlborough Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep't, 395 Mass. 117, 475 N.E.2d 137
(1985). See supra notes 106-112 and accompanying text.
150. This appears to be the position adopted by the court in Tavarez v. O'Malley, 635 F.
Supp. 1274 (N.D. Ill. 1986). In Tavarez, the plaintiffs sued an inspector of the Cook County
Department of Environmental Control, the Director of the Department, and the County,
claiming a deprivation of property without due process when county officials, in response to a
gas heater malfunction, sealed off the plaintiffs' grocery store and denied them access to the
building for a period of four weeks. Id. at 1275. The conduct of the County officials clearly
violated Cook County, Ill. Ordinance ch. 16, § 16-5.5-3(b), which provided an elaborate set of
procedures to be followed and prerequisites to be satisfied before any building could be sealed.
Id. at 1276 n.2.
In addressing the issue of the County's liability, the court acknowledged that the Director
of the Department was arguably the official responsible for establishing final County policy as
to certain matters of enviromental control. The court concluded, however, that the Director
had no discretion to choose a policy in direct violation of the County ordinance. Id. at 1277
n.3. Thus, even under Pembaur, conduct by the official possessing final authority on a matter
cannot be equated with "municipal policy" if that conduct violates formally promulgated law.
Addressing the question of individual liability on the part of the officials involved, the
court concluded that since their conduct was intentional, random, and unauthorized, there was
no violation of procedural due process if an adequate postdeprivation remedy existed under
state law. Id. at 1278-79.
In a subsequent opinion, the court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Village
of Schiller Park defendants. Tavarez v. O'Malley, 642 F. Supp. 291, 292 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Unlike the County, the Village apparently had no official policy or procedure to be followed in
the sealing of a building. Id. at 293. The defendants argued that the absence of such policy
precluded liability under section 1983, while the plaintiffs argued that the decision to seal,
made by the Deputy Superintendent of the Schiller Park Police Department, constituted mu-
nicipal policy within the meaning of Pembaur. Id. The court noted that counsel for both sides
were confusing "the analytically distinct constitutional concepts" of "policy," going to the
question of municipal liability for unconstitutional conduct of municipal employees, and "es-
tablished state procedure," going to the question of whether there is a procedural due process
claim in the first instance. Id.
Although the defendants were sued in their individual and official capacities, the court
concluded that since the Village was not a named defendant, Monell/Pembaur municipal pol-
icy arguments were out of place. The issue to be addressed was "whether there was a suffi-
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tion of the Second Circuit in Patterson"' is more persuasive and reflects
a logical convergence of the Logan established state procedure exception
with the Monell/Pembaur official policy doctrine: when the substantive
deprivation is effected by the same official responsible for providing
predeprivation process under state law, the state should be precluded
from arguing that it was impossible or impracticable to provide
predeprivation process because the state could not foresee or predict the
deprivation.15 2
IV. Analysis of Adequate Postdeprivation Remedy
If predeprivation process is not possible or practicable, the Par-
ratt/Hudson doctrine dictates dismissal of a procedural due process
claim unless the plaintiff asserts that state law provides no adequate
postdeprivation remedy for the alleged substantive deprivation. The
plaintiff will have the burden of establishing the inadequacy of the state
postdeprivation remedy."15
ciently 'established' state procedure such that a predeprivation hearing was constitutionally
required." Id. Characterizing the acts of the Village officials as "random and authorized," the
court concluded that such authorization was not tantamount to established state procedure
under Logan. Id. at 294-95 (emphasis in original). Expressly limiting its holding to the facts
of the particular case before it, the court concluded that predeprivation process was impracti-
cable under the circumstances and that due process concerns were satisfied by the availability
of state postdeprivation remedies. Id. at 295 & n.6. Finally, the court observed that where the
official vested with decisionmaking authority is also in a position to give notice, as well as
authorize the conduct resulting in the deprivation, and the circumstances in which the authori-
zation is given are "less haphazard," due process concerns may be more compelling. Id. at 295
n.6.
151. Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 879
(1986). See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Freeman v. Blair, 793 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1986). In Freeman, the plaintiffs
complained of a deprivation of property without due process when the license to operate their
campground was summarily suspended after their refusal to submit to an administrative in-
spection without a warrant. Id. at 169. The court noted that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine did
not apply where predeprivation process was practicable and, on the facts presented, deter-
mined that a predeprivation hearing was possible where the defendants were senior-level offi-
cials who were responsible for the decisions made. Id. at 177. In drawing an analogy to
Pembaur, the court stated: "Surely decisions made by the highest officials in the executive
branch of state government who have final authority over matters for which they are responsi-
ble do not constitute random and 'unauthorized' acts." Id. (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincin-
nati, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 1299 (1986)). But see National Communication Sys., Inc. v. Michigan
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 789 F.2d 370, 372-73 (6th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W.
3161 (U.S. Sept. 16, 1986) (No. 86-138) where the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the Parratt requirement of showing the inadequacy of state remedies applies only to depriva-
tions caused by random and unauthorized acts of misconduct, as opposed to the alleged con-
spiratorial acts involved in the case at bar, where the alleged conspirators were the public
officials whose duty it was to see that the plaintiffs were not denied due process.
153. See Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125
(1984) (the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving the inadequacy of state remedies to
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The Supreme Court has clearly stated that a state remedy is not
inadequate merely because the relief provided by the state postdepriva-
tion scheme is not as comprehensive as the relief available under section
1983.154 Since the plaintiffs in Parratt and Hudson could be fully com-
pensated for their loss of property under state law remedies, the Court
did not confront the issue of whether the state law remedy would be
considered adequate if the plaintiff received less than full compensation.
However, the Court has recently indicated that the timing of
postdeprivation relief is a factor to be considered in assessing the ade-
quacy of a remedy.15 In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,
the Court acknowledged that "[a]t some point, a delay in the post-termi-
nation hearing would become a constitutional violation." '156 Although
the Court concluded in Loudermill that a nine month administrative ad-
judication period was not unconstitutional per se, it did recognize as ap-
propriate a procedural due process claim based on administrative delay
in postdeprivation proceedings. 157
A. State Sovereign Immunity and its Effect on the Adequacy of the
Remedy
The issue that has generated the most controversy and debate in
postdeprivation remedy analysis is the effect, if any, state law immunity
defenses have on the adequacy of state law remedies. In Parratt, Justice
Powell suggested that an absolute immunity from suit under state law
would render the postdeprivation remedial scheme inadequate.158 This
redress a claimed wrong). But see Note, Parratt v. Taylor Revisited: Defining the Adequate
Remedy Requirement, 65 B.U.L. REv. 607, 636 (1985) (better approach would require plaintiff
to plead the inadequacy of the state remedy, but place the burden of proof on the defendant if
the issue is contested) [hereinafter cited as Note, Adequate Remedy].
154. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 534
(1984). See also McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1986) (while worker's compensa-
tion may not be as fully compensatory as suit under section 1983, the United States Constitu-
tion does not require total compensation for all injuries); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 584
(6th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (state remedy not rendered inadequate by nonallowance of attorney's
fees). But see Bumgarner v. Bloodworth, 738 F.2d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1984) (relief not adequate
under state law where Commission could make only monetary awards and the plaintiff was
seeking return of specific property); La Salle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 579 F. Supp. 8, 11-
12 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (state remedy inadequate because it did not provide for damages); Roman
v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1556 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (state remedy inadequate
when no injunctive relief or punitive damages available under wrongful death statute).
155. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
156. Id. at 1496.
157. Id.
158. 451 U.S. at 551 n.9 (Powell, J., concurring). Accord Nahmod, supra note 2, at 230
("[W]hen all of the potential defendants are absolutely immune under state law so that the
merits of the plaintiff's state claim cannot be reached, then the state remedy should be consid-
ered inadequate.").
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approach may also be inferred from Hudson, where the Court concluded
that the state postdeprivation remedy was adequate only after rejecting
the respondent's contention that his claim would be barred by sovereign
immunity. 159
In neither Parratt nor Hudson, however, was the Court confronted
with a situation in which an immunity defense was clearly available
under state law, thus forcing the Court to determine the impact of immu-
nity on the adequacy of postdeprivation process. In Parratt, it was clear
that the Nebraska tort claims procedure could have fully compensated
Taylor for the loss of his hobby kit."0 In Hudson, the Supreme Court
accepted the Court of Appeals' determination that adequate remedies
were available under state law to compensate the prisoner for his prop-
erty loss.161
In Davidson v. Cannon, 62 when three members of the Court reached
the issue of immunity, conflicting views were expressed regarding the im-
pact of immunity on the adequacy of the postdeprivation remedy. Jus-
tice Blackmun, writing for himself and Justice Marshall, concluded that
a state prison inmate had been deprived of a liberty interest without due
process of law when prison officials failed to protect the inmate from an
attack by another prisoner, and the state's immunity statute precluded
any meaningful postdeprivation remedy.1 63 The dissent's position was
based on the premise that "[c]onduct that is wrongful under § 1983 ...
cannot be immunized by state law." 16 This premise is supported by
Martinez v. California,65 in which the Supreme Court held that a state
immunity defense cannot be raised to defeat a claim based on the viola-
tion of a federal constitutional right. 16 6
The problem with Justice Blackmun's view in Davidson is that it
begs the question of whether a constitutional violation has occurred.
When only a procedural due process claim is being asserted, whether
conduct will be considered "wrongful" under section 1983 will depend
159. 468 U.S. at 535. See also Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451, 1457 (11th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1193 (1986) (such an inference strongly suported by Hud-
son); Ausley v. Mitchell, 748 F.2d 224,227-28 (4th Cir. 1984) (Winter, C.J., concurring) (Hud-
son strongly suggests that application of Parratt would not result in dismissal if sovereign
immunity defense is applicable).
160. 451 U.S. at 544.
161. 468 U.S. at 535.
162. 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
163. 106 S. Ct. at 675-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 676.
165. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
166. Id. at 284 n.8. In Martinez, the Court held that a state does not deny procedural due
process when a state law tort claim is defeated by a state law immunity defense. Id. at 282-83.
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upon whether a deprivation has taken place without due process of law.
The key issue is whether, in light of the immunity defense, the
postdeprivation procedures provide the process that is due under the
Fourteenth Amendment. As Justice Stevens noted, "Davidson puts the
question whether a state policy of noncompensability for certain types of
harm, in which state action may play a role, renders a state procedure
constitutionally defective." '167 Justice Stevens concluded that defenses
that might defeat recovery are not constitutionally defective unless their
operation is fundamentally unfair. In this context, he noted that the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity does not render a state postdeprivation pro-
cedure fundamentally unfair or constitutionally inadequate.
1 68
The Supreme Court's recent decisions eliminating due process
claims based on negligent conduct indicate that state immunity defenses
which shield state officials from liability for negligent performance of offi-
cial duties would simply be irrelevant to pursuing a procedural due pro-
cess claim under section 1983.169 Indeed, the Court's elimination of
negligence as a source for due process claims will substantially reduce,
for all practical purposes, the number of situations in which a state law
immunity defense will make compensation unavailable, since, in most
states, the immunity defense can be invoked as a shield for negligent con-
duct, but not for conduct that was reckless or intentional. 170 Further-
more, where state law establishes an immunity defense that would be
available to defendants as a matter of federal law as well, it would make
no sense to suggest that the limitation created by state law made the state
remedy inadequate. 17
1
167. Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 677, 680 (Stevens, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 680-81 (Stevens, J., concurring). Accord Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County, 764
F.2d 1451, 1458 (11th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1193 (1986) (state immunity statute
must be arbitrary and irrational to implicate procedural due process concerns); Temple v.
Marlborough Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep't, 395 Mass. 117, 128, 479 N.E.2d 137, 144 (1985)
(inability to recover damages under state law does not render state remedy inadequate).
169. Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668
(1986).
170. See, e.g., Tavarez v. O'Malley, 635 F. Supp. 1274, 1279-80 (N.D. Il1. 1986), where the
court assumes that provisions of the state Tort Immunity Act would not protect officials whose
conduct amounted to willful and wanton negligence or intentional or reckless disregard for the
safety or property of others; see also Nahmod, supra note 2, at 232-33.
171. See Note, Adequate Remedy, supra note 153, at 638 (if available immunity is the same
in state court as in federal court, the adequacy of the remedy is not affected); see also Temple v.
Marlborough Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep't, 395 Mass. 117, 129, 479 N.E.2d 137, 145 (1985)
(state remedy not inadequate where immunity under state law is identical to federal immunity
doctrine shielding judges from liability in section 1983 context).
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B. Adequacy in Fact vs. Systemic Fairness
The problem may be reduced to the issue of whether the
postdeprivation process is rendered constitutionally inadequate if the
state law immunity defense is broader than the federal immunity defense.
Courts must determine whether due process requires that every errone-
ous substantive deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest be ac-
tually redressed by compensation. Some courts have taken the position
that an adequate remedy means no more than an adequate opportunity
for a hearing.17a Other judges and commentators have assumed that the
availability of a sovereign immunity defense would make any
postdeprivation hearing meaningless by precluding compensation.1 73
There are several problems with an approach that requires actual
recovery or compensation for a remedy to be adequate. First, it is un-
likely that the Supreme Court in Parratt or Hudson intended a wholesale
abrogation of state immunity doctrines whenever they exceed the scope
of immunities available under federal law in section 1983 litigation.174
Second, requiring the federal court to assess the adequacy of a
postdeprivation state law remedy on the basis of whether the plaintiff
actually may receive compensation for an erroneous deprivation will lead
to protracted federal hearings whenever state law is unclear or a factual
dispute makes the applicability of a state immunity defense questiona-
ble. 175 Third, to insist that the federal court retain the case unless the
172. See, e.g., Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 832 (3d Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Garth, J.,
concurring), ajffd on other grounds sub nom. Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986)
("state may afford appropriate due process without that process necessarily resulting in a re-
covery for the claimant"); Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 797-98 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd en
banc, 748 F.2d 229 (1984), afl'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986) (due process is satis-
fied by an opportunity for a hearing before a tribunal authorized to grant a remedy); Groves v.
Cox, 559 F. Supp. 772, 775-76 (E.D. Va. 1983); Temple v. Marlborough Div. of the Dist. Ct.
Dep't, 395 Mass. 117, 128-29, 479 N.E.2d 137, 145 (1985).
173. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 748 F.2d 229, 233 (1984) (en bane) (Phillips, J., concur-
ring and dissenting), afJ'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986) (due process is denied if
sovereign immunity is raised as a bar to state postdeprivation remedy); Nahmod, supra note 2,
at 230; Note, Adequate Remedy, supra note 153, at 640-41 (due process requires a hearing and
a remedy).
174. Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451, 1458 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1193 (1986). As Professor Nahmod has noted, in discussing problems raised by the
adequate postdeprivation remedy inquiry, "State immunity doctrines may be in for constitu-
tional scrutiny, a scrutiny rather ironic in light of Parratt's avowed goal of reducing federal
judicial intervention in local matters." Nahmod, supra note 2, at 230.
175. See, e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1514 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane)
(Hill, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1970 (1986) ("not prepared to say that district
judges are required to hold hearings and make findings as to the adequacy in fact of recourse to
state courts in all of the counties and judicial districts embraced in their federal court dis-
tricts"); see also Nahmod, supra note 2, at 228 n.52 ("Federal courts may end up having to
struggle long and hard to develop standards for adequacy. This would be especially ironic,
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defendant stipulates to facts that would make the state immunity defense
inapplicable, allowing state compensation as a remedy, would put unfair
pressure on a defendant to admit intent or gross negligence when there
may have been none. It is unlikely that a defendant would be willing to
admit to liability in order to have the case heard in state court rather
than federal court. Furthermore, most defendants would not be willing
to waive a state law immunity defense. To require such waiver as a con-
dition for an adequate postdeprivation remedy and dismissal under the
Parratt/Hudson doctrine would be the equivalent of federal judicial abro-
gation of state law immunity defenses.
Those advocating this adequacy-in-fact test, which would require a
federal court to make a determination that the plaintiff could actually
recover for his injuries under state law before dismissing on Par-
ratt/Hudson grounds, acknowledge that "[t]he practical result of apply-
ing the strict adequacy test in such cases is that section 1983 claims will
generally remain in federal court unless the defendant abandons or
waives the state immunity defense." '176 This result would not be consis-
tent with a view of the Parratt/Hudson doctrine as a device for curtailing
the availability of the section 1983 remedy.177
A plaintiff concerned about the adequacy in fact of a state law rem-
edy might persuade the federal court to make its Parratt/Hudson dismis-
sal conditional, reserving the plaintiff's right to pursue a section 1983
remedy in federal court if the state immunity defense is held to bar relief
in state court. This approach has received considerable support from
both courts and commentators. 178  Although the conditional dismissal
approach avoids the problem of having the federal courts become en-
meshed in deciding the applicability vel non of state immunity defenses, a
federal court should permit resurrection of the section 1983 claim only if
allowing an immunity defense in a particular case would be irrational,
since it would mean that the federal § 1983 due process caseload would not decrease, but
would instead focus on a different level of the due process analysis.").
176. Note, Adequate Remedy, supra note 153, at 640.
177. See, e.g., Blackmun, supra note 2, at 23-25 (discussing Parratt and Hudson as cases
reflecting the recent trend of the Supreme Court to "cut back on section 1983 in any way it
can"); Nahmod, supra note 2, at 219 ("The scope of section 1983 may be directly diminished
by curtailing the scope of both the procedural and substantive components of due process.").
178. See, ag., Ausley v. Mitchell, 748 F.2d 224, 229-30 (4th Cir. 1984) (Winter, C.J., con-
curring), affid, 106 S. Ct. 879 (1986) (would require district court to grant leave to plaintiffs to
reinstate their claims if the sovereign immunity defense was upheld in state court) (citing
Blum, The Implications of Parratt v. Taylor for Section 1983 Litigation, 16 URB. LAW. 363,
380-81 (1984)); Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 383 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 897 (1983); Note, Adequate Remedy, supra note 153, at 637 (conditional dismissal recom-
mended as "a tool for federal courts to resolve the adequacy of remedy issue when state law is
uncertain").
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arbitrary, or discriminatory. Federal district courts should not become
forums for disgruntled plaintiffs who wish to invalidate, on federal due
process grounds, the kind or amount of recovery awarded under state
law or, indeed, the lack of any recovery under a fair and rational system.
A plaintiff whose section 1983 claim is dismissed from federal court
on Parratt/Hudson grounds without a conditional dismissal should be
careful to plead the section 1983 claim along with the state law claim in
state court. If the state court decides that an immunity defense is appli-
cable, rendering the state remedy inadequate, the court might reinstate
the plaintiff's section 1983 claim. 17 9
V. Pleading the Parratt/Hudson Doctrine
A. The Plaintiff's Perspective
From the plaintiff's perspective, there are several ways to avoid dis-
missal of a section 1983 fourteenth amendment due process claim on Par-
ratt/Hudson grounds.
(1) There is a clear consensus among the lower federal courts that
the Parratt/Hudson doctrine will not apply if a claim asserts the viola-
tion of a right protected by the Bill of Rights, independent of the Four-
teenth Amendment.18 0
(2) Where a complaint asserts a substantive due process violation,
a Parratt/Hudson dismissal is inappropriate.' It is recommended that
plaintiffs with claims based on excessive use of force in police-citizen en-
counters frame those claims as both fourth amendment and substantive
due process violations." 2 For zoning and land use claims, the majority
of federal courts appear willing to entertain complaints under the rubric
of substantive due process.' 83 The First Circuit, however, has consist-
ently refused to characterize zoning, licensing, or permit claims as four-
teenth amendment due process claims.18 4
(3) Although the majority of federal courts are applying the Par-
179. See, e.g., Carter v. City of Boston, No. 58892, slip op. (Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 1983)
(refusing to dismiss the plaintiff's section 1983 claim after reaching conclusion that the city's
exemption from liability under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act made the postdeprivation
remedy inadequate); Carter v. City of Boston, No. 81-1859-C, slip op. (D. Mass. Feb. 17, 1982)
(dismissing the plaintiff's section 1983 claim where the applicability of a defense under the
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act was unclear); see also Blum, The Implications of Parratt v.
Taylor for Section 1983 Litigation, 16 URB. LAW. 363, 379-81 (1984) (discussing Carter).
180. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
ratt/Hudson doctrine to claimed deprivations of life and liberty 185 as well
as property, plaintiffs should continue to argue that a distinction exists
until the Supreme Court makes a more definitive statement on the issue.
(4) If a plaintiff has only a procedural due process claim, a Par-
ratt/Hudson dismissal can be avoided by alleging that the deprivation
was pursuant to established state procedure and predeprivation process
was both possible and practicable. There are cases which support an ar-
gument that a deprivation is pursuant to established state procedure
when the conduct effecting the deprivation is unauthorized by, or con-
trary to, state law.18 6 Conduct pursuant to official policy or custom
should be sufficient to invoke the established state procedure exception to
the Parratt/Hudson doctrine.'87 Furthermore, a plaintiff who is denied
predeprivation process by an official or group with the authority to pro-
vide a predeprivation hearing admittedly due under both state and fed-
eral law, should rely on the Second Circuit's opinion in Patterson18 in
arguing against Parratt/Hudson dismissal. Finally, there is some support
for the argument that when a deprivation is caused by a policymaking
official, that deprivation, even if not pursuant to established state proce-
dure, should not be classified as random and unauthorized conduct for
purposes of applying Parratt/Hudson.189
(5) If a plaintiff does not successfully convince the court that the
alleged deprivation was pursuant to established state procedure and,
therefore, predeprivation process could have and should have been pro-
vided, a Parratt/Hudson dismissal of the section 1983 procedural due
process claim can still be avoided by attacking the adequacy of the state
postdeprivation remedy. There is support in Parratt and Hudson for the
argument that the availability of state sovereign immunity defenses
would make the state remedy inadequate.190 In addition, some lower
federal courts, as well as commentators, have urged that an adequacy-in-
fact analysis be applied. 1 If the applicability of a state immunity de-
fense is unclear, plaintiffs should ask the court to make any Par-
ratt/Hudson dismissal of the section 1983 claim conditional, preserving
the right to reinstate the federal claim in federal court should the state
court deny a remedy in fact. 192
185. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 163-173 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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B. The Defendant's Perspective
Defendants will want to persuade the court to dismiss a section 1983
due process claim on Parratt/Hudson grounds. The strength of a defend-
ant's position and the likelihood of getting a Parratt/Hudson dismissal,
will rest on how successfully the following factors can be argued:
(1) The plaintiff's claim does not assert the violation of a right pro-
tected by the Bill of Rights.
19 3
(2) The plaintiff's complaint does not allege conduct that "shocks
the conscience," thereby raising substantive due process concerns.' 94
Defendants should focus on the nature of the challenged conduct as well
as on the severity of the deprivation to the plaintiff. Even a deprivation
of life may not rise to the level of a substantive due process claim if the
challenged conduct resulting in the deprivation was merely negligent.'95
In land use, licensing, or permit cases, defendants should advocate the
First Circuit's view that decisions by local government units should not
implicate federal due process concerns absent some "fundamental proce-
dural irregularity, racial animus, or the like." '196
(3) Defendants will find considerable support for the view that the
Parratt/Hudson doctrine is applicable to deprivations of life and liberty,
as well as property. 197
(4) Once the defendant has reduced the claim to a procedural due
process claim, the position must be taken that predeprivation process was
neither possible nor practicable given the circumstances of the alleged
deprivation. To prevail on this point, the defendant must assert that the
alleged deprivation resulted from random and unauthorized conduct of
state officials rather than from established state procedure.' 98 Further-
more, defendants should argue that random and unauthorized conduct"
by high level policymaking officials is no more predictable by the state
than random and unauthorized conduct by lower level employees. 199 In
either situation, the state has not deprived the plaintiff of procedural due
process where the state was unable to provide predeprivation process, but
has available adequate postdeprivation remedies.
193. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
194. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). See supra notes 48-55 and accompa-
nying text.
195. Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 665 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668,
671 (1986).
196. Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (lst Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982). See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 99-118 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 134.
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(5) If it is clear that predeprivation process was impossible or im-
practicable, then the only basis for retaining the section 1983 procedural
due process claim is that the state postdeprivation remedy is constitu-
tionally inadequate. The Parratt Court asserts that the state remedy is
not inadequate merely because it fails to provide the same level of relief
that the section 1983 remedy might afford under similar circum-
stances."° While the effect of state law immunity defenses on the ade-
quate postdeprivation remedy analysis is unsettled, there is support for
an argument that state law immunity limitations on a remedy should not
render the remedy inadequate unless the operation of the immunity de-
fense is totally arbitrary, irrational, and fundamentally unfair.20 1 De-
fendants should argue that an adequate postdeprivation remedy does not
require adequacy in fact, but merely requires a postdeprivation process
which is rational and fundamentally fair.
Conclusion
The Parratt/ludson doctrine is still in its formative stages. To a
limited extent, the doctrine has taken on certain predictable contours.
The majority of lower federal courts appear to agree that the doctrine is
irrelevant where rights protected by the Bill of Rights20 2 or substantive
due process203 are involved. There is also a general consensus that the
doctrine is inapplicable where claims assert constitutional deprivations
effected by conduct pursuant to state law, custom, or policy.2°4 Finally,
a number of lower courts, both state and federal, are applying the Par-
ratt/Hudson doctrine to procedural due process claims involving depri-
vations of life and liberty, as well as property.20 5 Beyond these
important, but basically skeletal, components of the doctrine, the full
shape and impact of the new due process methodology remain to be seen.
Two major aspects of the doctrine will require clarification by the
United States Supreme Court. First, the Court will have to determine
the range of the established state procedure exception of Logan. This
Article has suggested an interpretation of the Logan exception which
would include not only conduct pursuant to state law, custom, or policy,
200. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 48-73 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 74-98 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Thibodeaux v.
Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1984); King v. Pace, 575 F. Supp. 1385, 1388 n.1 (D.
Mass. 1983); Temple v. Marlborough Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 395 Mass. 117, 124-25,
479 N.E.2d 137, 142-43 (1985).
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but also conduct contrary to or in violation of state law, where that con-
duct, even if limited to a single incident, amounts to a denial of
predeprivation process by the official entrusted under state law with the
responsibility for providing such process.2a 6 The extension of the estab-
lished state procedure exception to this context preserves one of the basic
tenets of Monroe, that conduct contrary to state law can be conduct
under "color of state law,"' 20 7 yet avoids making section 1983 a "font of
tort law,"' 20 8 since the contexts in which the "State" will be found to have
denied a plaintiff due process will still be quite limited. This approach
also provides some consistency between the concept of what constitutes
established state procedure for the purpose of invoking the Logan excep-
tion to the Parratt/Hudson doctrine and what amounts to official policy
for the purpose of imposing municipal liability under the Mo-
nell/Tuttle/Pembaur line of cases.2a 9
The second area that calls for further delineation by the Court is the
postdeprivation remedy analysis that is to be done in applying the Par-
ratt/Hudson doctrine. This aspect of the doctrine has the potential for
becoming a Pandora's box if the focus is on adequacy in fact. Federal
courts will become more, rather than less involved in matters of state tort
law if they are repeatedly called upon to assess the adequacy of state tort
remedies.2 '0 This Article has taken the position that concern in a proce-
dural due process inquiry should be for systemic fairness, rather than for
strict adequacy of a state remedy. 21 Thus, state law immunity defenses,
if rational and not invoked in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion,
should not affect the adequacy of a state law remedial scheme.
Judge Sheed no doubt expressed the wishful thinking of many prac-
titioners, judges, and law professors when he asserted that "[s]ooner or
later the Supreme Court will introduce more reason into this area than
presently exists. ' 212 Although the ultimate configuration of the Par-
ratt/Hudson doctrine must await further Supreme Court decisions, this
Article has set forth certain principles which the author believes should
inform the content and operation of the final product.
206. See supra notes 136-152 and accompanying text.
207. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961). See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying
text.
208. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
209. See supra notes 137-152 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 172-179 and accompanying text.
212. Gaut v. Sunn, 792 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1986) (Sneed, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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